Renewable electricity is pivotal to the medium and long-term reduction of Australia's greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, if deep cuts in them are eventually implemented. This paper examines the effectiveness of the principal existing policies that could potentially promote the expansion of renewable electricity (RElec) in Australia: the expanded Renewable Energy Target (RET); the proposed emissions trading scheme (ETS); and the state and territory based feed-in tariffs. We find the effectiveness of RET is severely eroded by the inclusion of solar and heat pump hot water systems; by the inclusion of 'phantom' tradable certificates; and by high electricity consumption growth. We also find that the ETS will not produce a high enough carbon price to assist most RElec technologies before 2020; and that most of the feed-in tariffs exclude large-scale RElec and will give little assistance to small-scale RElec because they are mostly net tariffs. Unless there is a major revision of its RElec policy mechanisms, Australia will fail to reach its renewable electricity target and in particular will fail to build up its solar generation capacity which could be a major source of future deep cuts in the country's electricity generation emissions. (192 words) 
Introduction
Australia is the largest per capita greenhouse gas (GHG) emitter in the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) (see Table   2 ). This is primarily due to the high percentage of coal (76%) in the fuel inputs to its electricity generation mix (IEA, website). Therefore, it could be argued that if Australia can achieve deep cuts in emissions from electricity generation, many other countries could emulate it. Electricity generated from renewable energy (RElec) is likely to be central to Australia's ability to make deep cuts in its GHG emissions. The current generating costs of RElec are higher than those of conventional fossil-fuel electricity and different types of RElec have different generation cost differences with fossil-fuel generated electricity. So it will largely be the success, or otherwise, of RElec support mechanisms and their effect on bridging these generation cost differences that will determine the future of RElec in Australia. Of course, if the price of fossil-fuel electricity included its external (environmental, health and social) costs support mechanisms for the lower-cost sources of RElec would be unnecessary (Rabl and Spadaro, 2000) . Carbon taxes and emissions trading can be seen as a means of internalising (at least to some degree) the external costs.
To date the major RElec support mechanism in Australia has been the modest Mandatory Renewable Energy Target Several commentators have examined the interaction of emissions trading and RPS mechanisms (Jensen and Skytte, 2003; Linares et al., 2008; Morthorst, 2001) . Others have examined the extent of global RElec resources and its implications for long-run RElec marginal costs (de Vries et al., 2007; Hoogwijk et al., 2004) . Linares et al (2008, pp. 380, 382, 383) argue that, because RPS tradable certificate prices represent the difference between the perceived longrun marginal cost of RElec and that of non-RElec electricity, an increase in nonRElec electricity costs through emissions trading should lower the RPS tradable certificate price. However, they also argue that, if the size of the RElec market is large compared to that of the emissions trading market, the relationship can work in reverse: an increase in the tradable certificate price can lower the ETS carbon price. The examinations of global RElec resources broadly conclude that most regions of the world do not have an abundance of a full range of RElec types. This paper adds to this knowledge by considering a RPS mechanism that grows from being relatively small, compared to the proposed national emissions trading market, to being relatively large, in a country that is blessed with a wide range of significant RElec sources.
Specifically, this paper evaluates (1) the medium-term effectiveness of emissions trading in stimulating RElec in Australia and (2) the potential stimulatory contribution of the expanded RET with reference to Australia's availability of RElec resources and the unique design features of the mechanism.
These aims are feasible, now that the shapes of the nation's ETS and expanded RET are clear. The paper uses modelled forecasts of Australia's emissions trading carbon price to predict what RElec stimulatory effect it will have in 2020 and projects the likely 2020 mix of the RElec stimulated by the expanded RET.
Section 2 discusses the role of RElec in achieving deep cuts in Australia's GHG emissions; part of section 2 discusses a 'diversified portfolio' approach to RElec development in Australia. Section 3 considers the historical impact of the MRET on Australia's RElec generation; section 4 discusses the possible effect of emissions trading on Australia's RElec; section 5 examines the prospect of reaching the expanded RET target; and section 6 draws conclusions about the future of RElec in Australia.
Throughout this paper several references are made to the pursuit of a 'diversified portfolio' approach to RElec development . The portfolio approach to RElec development is similar to the portfolio approach to investment risk management: an investment theory pioneered by Markowitz (1959) . Markowitz argued the optimisation of investment return has to be balanced against the acceptance of risk to achieve a desired rate of return. He said a diversified portfolio will generally have a lower cost, compared to a narrow portfolio, because of its lower risk even if some components of it have a relatively high cost. In RElec planning terms, a diversified portfolio approach means stimulating a range of RElec types, not just the least-cost ones (hydro, wind and biomass) as RPS mechanisms are designed to do. Awerbuch (2006) argues energy planning needs to abandon its fixation with least-cost fuels through the development of diversified portfolios. In this paper the RElec concentration index is used as an indicator of whether a diversified portfolio approach is being pursued. The RElec concentration index is calculated using the Herfindahl concentration index: the sum of the squares of the market shares of the RElec types that make up a nation's RElec portfolio. The Herfindahl index is often used to measure energy market concentration, for instance by the European Commission (2007). The higher the index, the more concentrated is the RElec mix. The index is widely used in competition analysis to determine if there is monopolistic or oligarchic behaviour: it is similar to the Simpson diversity index used in ecology.
2. The role of renewable electricity in reducing Australia's greenhouse gas emissions
The need for deep cuts in Australia's electricity greenhouse gas emissions
Climate change is a high-profile issue in Australia. Eventually, Australia's response to climate change is likely to require long-term deep cuts in its GHG emission entitlements. There are several reasons for this. Firstly, although Australia is a small global emitter responsible for about 1.4% of global GHG emissions, it is one of the world's highest per capita emitters and has the highest per capita emissions of any developed country (see Table 2 ). Its per capita emissions are about twice the OECD (unweighted) average and four times the global (unweighted) average (Garnaut, 2008 p.160) . Secondly, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC, 2007 p. 23) calculates that, to contain human GHG emission-induced global temperature increases to no more than 2.4°C above pre-industrial levels, considered then to be a moderately safe level of warming, it will be necessary to reduce global emissions by between 50% and 85% on 2000 levels by 2050. The 2.4°C limit would require global GHG concentrations to stabilise at around 450 CO2e ppm. An Australian government climate change inquiry conducted in 2008 found that if the country were to make a proportionate contribution to this GHG stabilisation scenario, consistent with eventual convergence of global per capita GHG emission entitlements, it would have to reduce its 2000-01 level of emissions by 90% by 2050 (Garnaut, 2008 p. 209) . More recently, some leading climate scientists are recommending stabilisation at 350 ppm CO2e (Hansen et al. 2008 ) and many support short-term targets of 25-40% below 1990 level by 2020. There are many areas where Australia could make major cuts in its GHG emissions, the most feasible are in electricity generation and use. Electricity is easier and less expensive to reform than other major sources of its emissions like agriculture and transport. It is also a prime target because electricity GHG emissions make up a larger proportion of Australia's national GHG emissions than they do for any other OECD country. Electricity generation accounted for 35.6% of Australia's net GHG emissions in 2000, nearly twice the OECD (unweighted) average that year of 18.3% (IEA, 2009b; WRI, 2009) 
The place of RElec in reducing Australia's electricity greenhouse gas emissions
There are two major ways in which the GHG emissions from Australia's electricity supply can be reduced: one is through using electricity more efficiently, the other is by switching all, or part, of its electricity supply to low or zero emission sources. 'Low emission electricity sources' means gas (both natural gas and coal seam methane), nuclear power, or coal with carbon capture and storage (CCS), if the latter two eventually become commercially available disadvantage of electricity generated from renewable sources is that it is currently significantly more expensive to generate than electricity generated from coal without CCS and generally more expensive than electricity generated from gas. As can be seen in Table 3 , even the least expensive generation from the least expensive type of RElec -on-shore wind -has a generation cost twice that of electricity generated from black coal in Australia: the most widely used fossil fuel used to generate electricity in the country. It should be noted that Table 3 does not specify the discount rate used to calculate the costs of electricity generation. A table by Diesendorf (2007 p. 355) , using an 8% discount rate, finds typically higher cost estimates for wind and solar than in Table 3 . Also, it is likely that the low end of the biomass costs in Table 3 represents landfill gas, for which there is only small potential in Australia, and that the high end may be more typical. In November 2009, A$1 ≈ US$0.9. Owen (2007 p. 3-6) .
The gap between what RElec and non-RElec can be sold for, with reasonable profitability, is larger in Australia than it is in most other developed countries. This is because Australia has relatively low retail electricity prices while having an RElec generation cost structure roughly similar to that of other developed economies. The country's low retail electricity prices have contributed to its economy being more electricity-intense than the OECD average since 1990 (IEA, 2009a) . This has placed an upward pressure on its electricity generation GHG emissions.
As shown in Figure I t a l y U n i t e d K i n g d o m P o r t u g a l H u n g a r y A u s t r i a J a p a n M e x i c o S p a i n G e r m a n y S w i t z e r l a n d P o l a n d G r e e c e K o r e a N e w Z e a l a n d U n i t e d S t a t e s A u s t r a l i a F r a n c e 
Advantages of a diversified 'portfolio' approach to RElec stimulation in Australia
To date Australia's market has developed a narrow non-hydro RElec base, mostly comprising on-shore wind and some biomass (see section 3), that does not constitute a diversified RElec portfolio. There are two major disadvantages to the persistence of a narrow RElec base in the country: the first is that the number and amount of premium, low-cost wind and biomass sites and resource is limited and, eventually, their marginal costs will rise as these sites and resources are exhausted. In Germany, where high levels of RElec support have exhausted most good sites, higher marginal costs of wind generation are already being experienced (Junginger et al., 2005 p.142 ). The second disadvantage is that a narrow RElec base exposes Australia to greater insecurity of energy price and supply than a more diversified base would; a portfolio approach to RElec generation in Australia would reduce this exposure (Albrecht, 2007; Awerbuch, 2006) . It could also reduce the risk of Australian RElec being exposed to cost increases during a rapid scaling-up of capacity which was experienced in the US wind industry in 2007 (Bolinger and Wiser, 2008) .
In Australia, estimates of the national long term low-to-medium cost on-shore wind resource range from 8 GW, with existing transmission capacity (Outhred, 2003 p. 3), which would supply about 5% of Australia's predicted 2030 electricity consumption, to 20% of its electrical energy in 2040 if the country's transmission capacity is expanded (Diesendorf, 2007 p. 127 ).
Australia's off-shore wind potential is limited, based on current (non-floating)
technology, because most of its coastal waters are deep and its population is concentrated in several cities located in areas of low to medium wind speed.
Nevertheless, there are a few potential sites of interest (Messali and Diesendorf, 2009 ). In general, to achieve a wind energy penetration of 20% while maintaining generation reliability, some limited back-up from additional peakload power plant may be required. In the unrealistic limiting case when all wind power is concentrated at a single site, required back-up capacity would be about half wind capacity (Martin and Diesendorf, 1982) . However, with geographic dispersion of wind farms and an extended transmission system, additional backup would in general be a small fraction of wind capacity and in some cases may be unnecessary (USDoE, 2008) . (Fouquet, 2009 ).
On a similar scale of potential capacity, Geoscience Australia estimates one per cent of Australia's hot rock geothermal resource could supply energy equivalent to 26,000 times the country's annual consumption (Ferguson, 2008) .
The largest area of this resource extends from north-east South Australia to south-west Queensland. Once again, grid extensions will be needed to tap it.
Unlike Europe ( 
The success and failure of the MRET in stimulating RElec

Origins of the Renewable Portfolio Standard
Australia was one of the first countries in the world to adopt the RPS mechanism which was originally developed in the United States. The mechanism's big strengths are that, in theory, it delivers a pre-determined and certain level of RElec generation and has an in-built incentive for electricity suppliers to source least-cost RElec. Its big disadvantages are that it has no inbuilt incentive to purchase electricity from a wide range of RElec types and has no in-built structure that necessarily decreases the support given to RElec over time. at arresting a long term decline in the proportion of Australia's electricity generated by RElec. In the early 1960s nearly a quarter of the country's electricity was generated by RElec; by the commencement of MRET only 8%
The
was (Tambling, 2003 p. 11) .
As shown in As shown in 
RECs issued in Australia under MRET
At first sight it seems MRET has been successful at stimulating a broad range of RElec types. As indicated in Figure 6 , solar hot water, in addition to wind and biomass (mostly made up of landfill gas and sugar cane waste), are the non-hydro RElec sources that have been the major beneficiaries of the mechanism. But the significant level of solar hot water generation is not a product of MRET alone. It has also been stimulated by a range of federal, state and local government installation subsidies. Once this is factored in, Australia's MRET has not performed that differently from RPS mechanisms in other countries that use it. In general, the mechanism has only succeeded in stimulating the least-cost RElec types of wind and biomass. The big losers from Two ways of pursuing a diversified portfolio approach to RElec development, whilst using a RPS, are:
• to use a high-volume feed-in tariff (a mechanism that guarantees above-market Table 5 . In addition to the Table 5 targets, RET will also include 0.85 TWh/y coal seam gas generation by 2020 but this is not a type of RElec. As shown in Table 6 , the increase in the intended amount of RElec generation, to be driven by both MRET and the expanded RET between 2005 and 2020, is predicted to be equal to about 45% of the projected electricity generation increase over the period. The current Australian government plans to phase out the expanded RET after 2030 by which time it claims its proposed ETS -the CPRS -will be performing the same function in terms of bridging the cost gap between RElec and conventional coal-fired electricity generation.
According to the CPRS White Paper: 'The Government's emissions reduction strategy has four foundation elements: the Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme, the Renewable Energy Target, carbon capture and storage, and energy efficiency' (DCC, 2008b p. 19-4) . So the obvious question is: will the CPRS and expanded RET make a significant contribution to GHG emissions reduction by stimulating Australia's RElec? 
The potential effectiveness of the CPRS in stimulating Australia's RElec
Treasury's modelling of GHG reduction carbon prices
The Australian Treasury department's modelling of the economic impact of national GHG reduction focused on four different national GHG reduction scenarios where, compared to the country's 2000 level of GHG emissions, reductions of 5%, 10%, 15% and 25% were made by 2020. However, the CPRS White Paper, published in December 2008, stipulated the maximum GHG emissions cut that would be made by Australia would be 15% by 2020, subject to major international actions, and that the 'unconditional' reduction would be 5%. Subsequently, in May 2009, the Australian government increased the upper limit of the cuts to 25%, subject to conditions that, so far, have not been met (Wong, 2009a) . When announcing the possible 25% cut, the Australian Prime
Minister said it would only be enacted if 'the world agrees to stabilise levels of CO2-e in the atmosphere at 450ppm or less by 2050' Australia is ultimately likely to commit to a 10% to 15% GHG emissions cut on 2000 levels by 2020. In late January 2010, the Australian government submitted a 5% to 25% range of possible reductions as its commitment to the Copenhagen accord saying it would not pledge to cut by more than 5% until 'the level of global ambition becomes sufficiently clear' (Wong 2010) . The commencement and 2020 emissions trading scheme carbon prices that Treasury's modelling found would be associated with the 5%, 15% and 25% scenarios are given in 
The impact of CPRS carbon prices on RElec stimulation
Figure 7 takes the current RElec and non-RElec generation costs quoted in Table 3 then adds in Treasury's 5%, 15% and 25% 2020 GHG reduction carbon prices, taking account of the carbon intensities of the non-RElec sources, to get an approximate idea of 2020 post carbon pricing generation cost relativities (though future generation costs will be subject to the different cost forces mentioned in section 2.2). In Figure 7 , the generation cost gap between the five different types of RElec, and that of electricity generated from black coal, remains significant except for wind and biomass. However, if Table 3 underestimates the prices of wind and biomass, as Diesendorf's (2007) Table   B .2 suggests, then even most wind and biomass may be unable to benefit from the CPRS's carbon prices. Furthermore, a carbon price of A$120/tCO2e, that is likely to be politically unacceptable, would be needed to stimulate the full cost range of all the RElec types (Treasury, 2008) . Diesendorf (2007) estimates that even higher carbon prices would be needed to stimulate solar electricity, at least in the short-term. This suggests RElec in Australia is likely to be only marginally expanded by emissions trading by 2020, beyond that planned by MRET and the expanded RET. This is especially the case if RET reduces carbon prices in the short term. It also suggests that, unless carbon prices rise significantly after 2020 and remain consistently at high levels, they will not have the RElec stimulatory effect the government is anticipating they will have after 
Criticisms of the combined effect of emissions trading and the RET on RElec in Australia
There has been criticism of the situation that emissions trading and the expanded RET may work side-by-side from 2011 until 2030 in Australia. Some argue that, together, the two mechanisms will concentrate too much of the country's GHG reduction burden on the electricity sector, resulting in higher electricity prices than would exist under the CPRS alone (CRA International, 2007 p. 18; Productivity Commission, 2008 p. 72) . They also argue this concentration on electricity will have other undesirable outcomes including lower carbon prices than would exist if the expanded RET did not exist (CRA International, 2007 p. 13) . Several large electricity users, most notably aluminium smelters, have succeeded in obtaining exemptions from the electricity price increases resulting from the expanded RET.
Whilst these criticisms have some validity in the short term, they ignore the longer term benefits of having a significant RElec base in Australia, especially its role in reducing its GHG emissions. It also needs to be remembered that the lower carbon prices generated by the two mechanisms working together will compensate for some of the higher cost of RElec. The expanded RET should help reduce the long-term generation costs of RElec by making economies of scale cost reductions available and by bringing forward other learning-by-doing cost reductions (that come through better approval processes, better finance practices, reductions in equipment costs etc) (MMA, 2007 p. 5).
The prospects of reaching the RElec generation target of the RET
An optimistic scenario for Australia's 2020 RElec
In reaching the RElec goal of 60 TWh/y of RElec by 2020, the conventional view is that wind generation will increase to take up at least half of the 35.5 TWh/y difference between the MRET target (including pre-MRET RElec generation) and the 2020 expanded RET target (MMA, 2007 p. 6) . To generate half the difference, the installed wind generating capacity in Australia will need to increase five-fold from the 2008 level of 1,306 MW to about 8,600
MW (assuming a 30% capacity factor, which is typical for on-shore wind farms in Australia). Reaching this capacity will require a 17% compound rate of annual growth between 2008 and 2020. As can be seen from Beyond wind, most of the balance to reach the 2020 expanded RET target is expected to come from biomass and hot rock geothermal generation (Ernst and Young, 2008 p. 5) . At this stage, both the biomass and geothermal industries think they can deliver Table 9 . However, Table 9 does not take account of RECs created by solar hot water heaters. Although they are currently a major creator of RECs, one prediction is that by 2020 they will only be responsible for about 8% of the RECs market (MMA, 2009 p. 36) . However, their future RECs creation strongly depends on non-RET subsidy levels and regulations (see s5.
3) and so 8% may be an underestimate (see section 5.3). 
Australian RElec resource and technology limitations
However, significant problems may be encountered in reaching the RElec generation levels in Table 9 . Apart from the possible limitation of the inability of wind capacity to expand at the required rate, the expansion of biomass generation from sugarcane waste may be constrained by fluctuating global sugar prices as well as concerns about the ongoing viability of the sugar industry (Ernst and Young, 2008 p. 12) . There are also concerns about the amount of transport fuel needed to collect biomass. The ability to source biomass electricity from wood waste is restricted by the fact that if it comes from native forest logging it cannot be used as an RElec source in most Australian states and there is limited capacity to expand landfill gas generation in the country. In addition, drought could constrain the use of biomass residues from the wheat industry.
The generation of geothermal electricity in Australia from hot rock technology has its own set of constraints: although there is a huge resource, the technology is in its infancy, is very capital intensive and therefore subject to the vagaries of the equity and debt markets, and will require the construction of long transmission lines to be able to feed into Australia's National Electricity Market grid.
Design limitations of the RET
The resource and technology limitations mentioned in the previous water heater and heat pump RECs coming to market may be felt long after the demand for them subsides. Arguably, the principal barrier to the rapid diffusion of solar hot water is the requirement of many local governments in Australia for planning permission for these systems, a process that can take weeks. This has the effect that, when an existing electric hot water system breaks down at the end of its life, householders tend to install another electric hot water system, since this can be done within one day. The solution is for state governments to ban the required planning permission for accredited solar water heaters (Diesendorf, 2007 p.155) . Potentially an even worse RET design flaw is that more than half the increase in RET's target, at least over the next five years, when the solar hot water subsidy was increased. This resulted in major concern being expressed about the fall in RECs prices (Environment Victoria et al., 2009; Parkinson, 2009; Wong, 2009b) . Another influence that may work against RET producing RElec generation equal to 20% of Australia's grid-connected electricity generation by 2020 is the rate of electricity generation growth in the country. Unlike RPS targets in other countries, the RET's target is specified in TWh per year (see Table 5 Table 10 shows that the predicted 2.1% annual growth between 2007 and 2020 is well below the average annual rate of growth since 1997-98 (3.3%). It is not inconceivable that the average annual rate of generation growth will fall to the predicted rate, but much will depend on the price of electricity (including carbon pricing) and the effect it has on increasing electricity usage efficiency and decreasing demand growth. At the very least, RET's TWh target needs periodic revision to ensure it remains consistent with RET's 20%-by-2020 target. On top of the aforementioned potential hurdles, the feed-in tariffs so far announced by Australia's state and territory governments are unlikely to significantly augment the amount of RElec induced by the RET. This is because all the feed-in tariffs schemes, with the exception of the Australian Capital
Territory's (ACT) one, are only aimed at small generators of solar photovoltaic electricity. Also, they only create a modest incentive because they are generally based on the net amount RElec generators feed into the grid, not the gross amount (with the exception of ones in New South Wales and the ACT).
Even if the above mentioned design flaws are removed from the expanded RETwith the result that wind, biomass and hot rock geothermal manage to deliver the extra RElec generation required to reach the 20% target -solar electricity will remain a marginal player in Australia's RElec generation because of its current high generation cost. Without a mechanism to stimulate large solar power stations, the country will still have a narrow spectrum of RElec sources from which major cuts in its GHG emissions might one day be delivered. Either a relaxation of the restrictions on the feed-in tariffs, specific bands in the expanded RET, large government capital subsidies or tax deductions are needed for large-scale solar generation to significantly expand in Australia. In addition, a strengthening and expansion of the country's transmission network is required for RElec generated in remote locations to expand.
Conclusions about the future of renewable energy electricity in Australia
This paper leads to two broad conclusions about the future of RElec in
Australia. The first is that the 45 TWh/y MRET/RET 2020 target is unlikely to be reached, for two reasons. Firstly, wind, biomass and hot rock geothermal generation may not be able to expand fast enough to reach it. This is unlikely to be a problem if effective government policies are enacted to bridge the price gaps between these sources and conventional coal-fired electricity. Secondly, a substantial barrier is that most of the increase in the target is likely to be taken up by RECs created by solar and heat pump hot water as well as by 'phantom'
residential RElec systems, with the result that their prices will remain low, at least until 2015. The negative effect of these design flaws will have on the attainment of RET's target may be made worse by low hydro generation and by higher-than-predicted growth in grid-connected electricity generation. Also, it is very unlikely that either the CPRS, or state and territory feed-in tariffs, will stimulate much RElec in addition to that stimulated by MRET and the expanded RET, before 2020 at the earliest.
The second broad conclusion is that, with continued use of the MRET/RET mechanisms to stimulate most of the nation's RElec, it is unlikely Australia will develop a broad enough RElec base from which it could one day make deep cuts in its GHG emissions. In their present forms, the expanded RET, and the CPRS cannot be relied upon to push the RElec industry into large quantities of generation sufficient be able to deliver deep cuts in Australia's GHG emissions at least until 2020.
